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Abstract
Welfare-to-work policy in the UK sees ‘choice’ regarding lone parents’ employment
decisions increasingly defined in terms of powers of selection between options within active
labour market programmes, with constraints on the option of non-market activity progressively
tightened. In this paper, we examine the wider choice agenda in public services in relation to
lone-parent employment, focusing on the period following the 2007 Freud Review of welfare
provision. (Freud, 2007) Survey data are used to estimate the extent to which recent policies
promoting compulsory job search by youngest dependent child age map onto lone parents’
own stated decision-making regarding if and when to enter the labour market. The findings
indicate a substantial proportion of lone parents targeted by policy reform currently do not
want a job and that their main reported reason is that they are looking after their children.
Economically inactive lone mothers also remain more likely to have other chronic employment
barriers, which traverse dependent child age categories. Some problems, such as poor health,
sickness or disability, are particularly acute among those with older dependent children who
are the target of recent activation policy.
Introduction
Welfare-to-work policy in the UK increasingly frames ‘choice’ in relation to
employment decisions in terms of consumer-type powers of selection between
options within active labour market programmes. Any increase in choice within
employment services, however, has sat alongside heightened constraints on the
option of choosing non-market activity if you are a recipient of out-of-work
benefits. In the past, lone parents with children below 16 years of age maintained
the right to decide whether to seek paid work without risk of sanction. Drawing on
the recommendations of the Freud Review of welfare-to-work provision (Freud,
2007), the 2007 Green Paper on Welfare Reform, In Work Better Off, marked
a critical juncture in policy, proposing a new social contract that strengthens
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lone parents’ obligations to seek paid work (DWP, 2007). Since October 2008,
lone parents whose youngest dependent child is above twelve years of age lose
eligibility to Income Support (IS) on the grounds of being a lone parent if they
are assessed as able to work and it can be demonstrated that they will be ‘better
off’ in paid work. From 2010, this is extended to lone parents whose youngest
dependent child is above seven years old and from 2011 it will be extended to lone
parents whose youngest dependent child is five and above (HM Treasury, 2010:
49).
These reforms involve a shift of the lone-parent IS caseload onto Jobseeker’s
Allowance (JSA), a benefit with greater conditionality, mandated job search and
powers of sanction. Such developments align with proposals that aim to simplify
and reform out-of-work benefits (Gregg, 2008). Claimants are to be more directly
addressed in terms of their existing readiness to enter paid work rather than cate-
gorised according to benefit recipient category (DWP, 2008b; Convery, 2009: 10).
In this paper, we examine the choice agenda in relation to welfare reform and
lone-parent employment in the period following the Freud Review (Freud, 2007).
Large-scale survey data are used to estimate the extent to which economically
inactive lone parents state they would presently like paid work and, if not, their
main reported reasons. This is undertaken to provide an overview of the extent
to which policies that promote compulsory job search by dependent child age
map onto lone parents’ own stated decision making regarding if and when to
enter the labour market.
Plans to heighten conditionality in light of the substantial proportion of lone
parents we identify whose stated position is that they presently do not want to seek
paid work reinforces how the notion of choice is limited to a particular form of
acceptable behaviour, grounded in the prioritisation of the formal economy.
Although economic activity is related to dependent child age, the findings
demonstrate that employment barriers, such as poor health, sickness or disability,
are particularly pronounced among those with older children. The potential side
effect of increased compulsory activation is that, without satisfactory support,
an increase in the number of lone parents entering the labour market who face
greater employment barriers, or who ‘choose’ currently not to seek paid work, will
negatively impact on job retention rates and the economic stability of lone-parent
families.
The choice agenda and welfare reform
Largely eschewed during New Labour’s first term in office, an emphasis on
choice and marketisation subsequently featured strongly in public service reform
in regard to how to encourage a more diverse range of providers and ‘empower’
service users in various policy sectors, such as health, social care and education
(Greener, 2008: 222; Needham, 2008: 182). Choice has been presented as the
means to drive efficiency and effectiveness and build support for public provision
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of welfare services (Brown, 2007; Needham, 2008: 181). As a policy mechanism,
choice also holds out the promise to free politicians and the public from past
frustrations and failures in public service delivery (Clarke et al., 2007: 246).
Implementing the choice agenda with respect to employment and social
security, however, is somewhat problematic. It contains within it a message that
is subversive of the prevailing welfare reform agenda. After all, if choice is central
to empowering users and they are best placed to choose how to benefit from public
services, should some claimants have the option to choose, in their self-defined
interests, to not participate in the labour market or activation programmes, while
maintaining their welfare entitlements?
Lone parenthood presents an interesting case for the evolving choice agenda,
as does non-market care activity more generally. Benefit entitlements in the
absence of job search conditionality for the ‘economically inactive’ have largely
been confined to people who are assessed as presently unable to take up paid work.
The right to social security support has, nonetheless, increasingly been hedged
around with conditions that stipulate individual ‘acceptable’ responsibilities
linked to paid work activity. Previous exemptions from the need to be actively
seeking work, such as lone parents’ participation in caring activity or, in the
general population, for reasons of personal sickness or disability, are thus subject
to ongoing challenge and have been weakened as benefit eligibility criteria are
tightened (Dwyer, 2004: 268, 2008).
Greener (2007: 259) argues that the version of choice New Labour promoted
is grounded in the extension of consumer rights, standards and expectations to
the delivery of public services. This is combined with the notion of individualised
responsibilities, with claimants required to accept their responsibility to be
independent productive members of the labour market. New Labour’s approach
to ‘citizenship’ concerned itself with the exercise of welfare rights and provision
of state support in relation to an individual’s obligations (Giddens, 2002: 16;
Clarke, 2005: 451), an approach that continues to inform welfare policy under
the Coalition Government (Duncan-Smith, 2010). Such an approach offers little
space for people to define for themselves how these obligations might or should
be enacted. Instead, the active responsible citizen is one chiefly defined in terms
of their contribution to the labour market. Individual decisions regarding paid
work are subjugated to macro-economic policy objectives concerning labour
market flexibility, wage inflation and welfare expenditure containment. New
Labour’s employment and social security measures to bolster labour market
entry by the non-employed were primarily concerned to reduce long-term labour
market detachment. Detachment from the labour market risks the erosion of
skill levels and employers’ willingness to hire the long-term non-employed. As
a consequence, the ability of the non-employed to compete effectively for jobs
and bear down on wage costs, thought necessary to promote higher levels of
employment, is compromised (Grover and Stewart, 2002: 62). Welfare reform
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seeks to improve the effective supply of labour and its flexibility through reducing
financial barriers to employment and tightening benefit conditionality (Grover,
2005: 76; Grover and Piggott, 2007: 738).
It is from within these contexts that constraints operating on the expansion
of choice in the field of welfare-to-work become visible. Yet fuller recognition
of the value of non-market forms of work and the validity of choosing care
could permit policy to better address the reality of life for many outside of, and
marginal to, the labour market. It could also enhance the capacity people have
for self-determination in the balance between paid work and family life, which
low-paid individuals may experience as unpredictable and unsatisfactory (Dean,
2007: 526; Williams, 2001).
For lone parents, as for the primary carers of children (the vast majority of
whom are women) more generally, decisions about whether and when to enter
paid work are multi-faceted. These may reflect the deliberation of opportunities,
but also structural barriers or constraints, such as childcare availability, a lack
of potential labour market opportunities, issues around access to paid work and
transportation or the marginal financial value of employment (for example, see
Bell et al., 2005; Lewis, 2003; Hoxhallari et al., 2007; Millar and Ridge, 2008).
Socially situated but personal notions of what constitutes responsible
parenting also affect the choices people make (Duncan and Irwin, 2004; Edwards
et al., 2002). Considerable variation exists between parents in what is understood
to constitute ‘good parenting’ in relation to decisions regarding the balancing
of paid work and family life (for example, Duncan and Edwards, 1999). Current
welfare-to-work policy, in demanding lone-parent labour market activation by
dependent child age, thus effectively constrains an aspect of self-determination
regarding what good parenting is enacted to entail.
We do not seek to disparage ‘choice’ as an objective, but to recognise its
limitations and draw a contrast between the promotion of market-orientated
choice by governments and their resistance to choices around non-market-based
activities. The former Secretary for State for Work and Pensions, James Purnell,
was quite clear that there could be no choice not to work:
We will provide better support, and expect more responsibility in return. Claimants should
have the choice over how to get back to work, not whether they should go back to work. We
want a work culture not a welfare culture. (Purnell, 2008)
Lone parents and welfare-to-work reform post-Freud
Although policy reform following the Freud Review (Freud, 2007) has sought to
increasingly constrain the option of remaining outside of the labour market for
lone parents deemed able to work, it would be unfair to suggest the New Labour
Government did little other than tighten benefit eligibility conditions in order to
encourage the take up of employment. A sizeable component of welfare reform,
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while not exclusively focused on lone parents, facilitated greater choice by making
paid work, an option previously less plausible for many lone parents, more feasible
(Lewis, 2003; Bell et al., 2005). Policy measures to make paid work more financially
attractive have included: the National Minimum Wage, Working Tax Credit/Child
Tax Credit, the National Childcare Strategy, Work Focused Interviews with
Personal Advisers and active labour market programmes, such as the New
Deal for Lone Parents. Where available, lone parents were able to participate
voluntarily in the Employment Zones (EZs) programme (see Knijn et al.,
2007: 645). The EZs contained the seeds of future reforms developed by New
Labour’s Flexible New Deal and the Coalition Government’s Work Programme.
Rolled out as pilots in 13 areas of the country in 2000, and largely delivered by
private sector organisations, EZs enjoyed considerable flexibility over how to
move clients into paid work in comparison to New Deal providers. The EZs were
initially targeted at the long-term unemployed who were mandated to participate,
although from 2003 the opportunity to participate was extended to lone-parent
volunteers. In 2004, the EZs underwent further reform, with the introduction of
Multiple Provider Employment Zones (MPEZ) in six areas. The aim here was
to create greater competition between providers. The clients of the MPEZ were,
initially, randomly allocated to a provider by a Jobcentre Plus adviser, but in 2007
clients were permitted to select their provider (Rafferty and Wiggan, 2008: 31).
In the EZ programme, we see experimentation with a more expansive role for
contracted return-to-work providers, together with the operation of consumerist
rights and the enforcement of individual responsibilities. Many of the users were
not there through choice for example. The long-term unemployed and New Deal
for Young People returnees participated through direction and under the threat
of sanction. As in other policy fields, the notion of choice has been collapsed
into a market model of exchange, so that choice is principally concerned with
operationalising (acceptable) options in response to signals concerning efficiency
and effectiveness (Clarke et al., 2007: 248).
The recommendations made by the Freud Review (Freud, 2007) show a debt
to the approach taken in the EZs, as well as to the growing international emphasis
on personalisation and contracting out (Finn, 2009). The Freud Review proposed
merging all New Deal schemes into a ‘Flexible New Deal’. The Review argued
that, while claimants do have particular needs, they also face common obstacles
to employment, irrespective of their age, disability, gender or parenthood status,
and a common platform would help spread best practice. Flexible New Deal,
it was proposed, would also build on previous experience of contestability to
expand the use of the private and voluntary sector in the provision of welfare-
to-work services, particularly for those most likely to face greater obstacles to
participation in the labour market (DWP, 2007: 58; DWP, 2008a; DWP, 2008b).
The Flexible New Deal also incorporated greater freedom for providers to
shape the services offered to clients through a ‘black box’ approach. In this model,
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Jobcentre Plus sets the desired outcomes, but does not prescribe the methods
providers may use in order to achieve them (DWP, 2008a: 119). The Coalition’s
active labour market scheme, the Work Programme, to be introduced in Great
Britain in 2011, replaces the Flexible New Deal, but shares many of the features of
Flexible New Deal. This is not surprising given that David Freud helped inform
development of the Work Programme as Shadow Minister for Welfare Reform
for the Conservative Party and continues to assist its development as Minister for
Welfare Reform in the Coalition Government. The Work Programme expands
the market in welfare-to-work services and develops the ‘black box’ payment-
by-results performance model. Contracted providers from the not-for-profit and
for-profit sectors will continue to be rewarded primarily according to client job
outcomes, but enjoy the freedom to tailor services to clients’ perceived needs
(Grayling, 2010).
As reforms to active labour market programmes have intended to foster the
notion of the responsible citizen, independent and within the labour market,
changes to the benefit system to tighten eligibility conditions have sought
to buttress this. New Labour’s 2006 Green Paper, A New Deal for Welfare:
Empowering People to Work (DWP, 2006), proposed replacing Incapacity Benefit
and IS paid on the grounds of incapacity with a new benefit: Employment and
Support Allowance (ESA). Following the Welfare Reform Act (2007), the ESA was
introduced in October 2008. ESA tightens eligibility for out-of-work benefits on
grounds of disability or sickness. Recipients are subject to a Work Capability
Assessment that examines what paid work participants may be capable of, rather
than what paid work they cannot do (DWP, 2008a). Those judged to be able
to move into the labour market in the medium or short term are placed in the
‘Work Related Activity Group’ (WRAG) of ESA and required to participate in
employment-related activities as part of establishing a route back into the labour
market. Alternatively, they are moved to Jobseekers’ Allowance to begin job-
search activity immediately. Claimants deemed unable to move into employment
even in the long term are placed in the ‘Support Group’ with no requirement to
engage in work-related activity (DWP, 2008b: 69).
The tailoring of conditionality to employment readiness, needs and/or
responsibilities and not to specific benefit category echoed the recommendations
of the Gregg report, which reviewed conditonality in the benefit system for
the Department of Work and Pensions (Gregg, 2008). Gregg also proposed
that requirements for participation in work-related activity be extended to lone
parents with children below three years of age (Gregg, 2008: 57). New Labour’s
agreement with the broad thrust of Gregg’s (2008) proposals was outlined in the
White Paper, Raising Expectations and Increasing Support: Reforming Welfare for
the Future (DWP, 2008b: 76). The prioritisation of labour market participation
was affirmed by the Welfare Reform Act (2009), which includes the power necessary
for the Secretary of State to abolish IS in the future, and move claimants to
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Jobseekers’ Allowance or ESA. Under New Labour, the requirement to engage in
work-related activity would be focused (at least initially) on lone parents with
children aged between three and seven. The door was left open to the extension
at a later date of a requirement to participate in work-related activity to lone
parents with children aged between one and three (DWP, 2008b: 123). As noted
earlier, the Coalition has already announced that from October 2011 lone parents
with a youngest dependent child aged five or over are to be moved to the more
‘active’ Jobseekers’ Allowance (HM Treasury, 2010).
Such developments are not surprising, given what appears a cross-party
consensus on welfare rights as conditional entitlements dependent on duties
met and values adhered to (Dwyer, 2004: 277), rather than as social rights
that are ‘inalienable’. Welfare reform is permeated by the notion that paid
employment will secure the independence of the individual and their family, and
that encouraging participation in paid work is, and should be, the main priority
for policy (Blair, 2002; Brown, 2007). Yet, as Grover and Stewart (2002: 7) among
others have pointed out, for those moving into low-paid work, the reality is often
exchanging dependence on out-of-work benefits for dependence on in-work
benefits in the form of the Working Tax Credit and state financial support for
childcare (HM Treasury, 2008). Given government effectively exercises control
over the minimum income of low-wage families, it is difficult to conclude that
lone parents in low-paid employment achieve independence from the state.
Method
Data
In the remainder of the paper, we consider whether activation policies,
tapered by age of youngest dependent child, fit with what lone parents actually
say regarding whether or not they currently wish to seek paid work. Lone parents’
experiences have been explored through qualitative research, examining their
reasons for not seeking paid work and barriers faced towards employment (for
example, Ford, 1996; Duncan and Edwards, 1999; Rowlingson and McKay, 2005;
Millar, 2006; Millar and Ridge, 2008). Information on the reasons people give for
not seeking paid work is also collected across a number of government surveys,
giving a broad but nationally representative overview. To provide a sample of lone
parents of suitable magnitude, we use two quarters of the UK Quarterly Labour
Force Survey (QLFS), pooling together independent samples from the Winter
2006 and Winter 2007 quarters. These years were selected as they sit before recent
reforms to compulsory activation. The small sample size of lone fathers means
our analysis is chiefly restricted to lone mothers.
Outcome measures
The first outcome measure we consider is the extent to which people claiming
IS on grounds of lone parenthood state they are looking for paid work and, if
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not, whether or not they would currently like a job. The QLFS collects detailed
information on the self-reported reasons people give for not undertaking paid
work, used to construct international definitions of employment, unemployment
and ‘economic inactivity’.1 The questionnaire routing for respondents who state
they are not currently in paid work takes them through a series of questions
regarding whether they were looking for work in the last four weeks. If they were
not looking for work, respondents are asked whether ‘they would like to have a
regular job at the moment, either a full- or part-time job’. This question routing
is used to define our first measure.
Despite people claiming IS on grounds of lone-parent status being a key
target group for changes to activation policy, it is likely that some lone parents
will not be required to seek paid work in the short term for other reasons, such as
poor health or disability, provided they are eligible for claiming ESA. Although
it is difficult based on the current data to estimate the incidence of this group,
it remains instructive to examine the extent to which poor health or disability
are reported by lone parents as their main reason for not seeking paid work. In
the QLFS, respondents who have not sought paid work during the four-week
reference period are questioned regarding why this is the case, with up to eight
reasons recorded. If more than one reason is given, they are asked to state their
main reason. Based on these questionnaire items, we have grouped reported main
reasons into four categories:
• people who state they are not looking for paid work, currently they would
not like a job, and the (main) reason for not looking for work is that they are
looking after their child(ren);
• people who state they are not looking for paid work, but currently they
would like a job, but the (main) reason they are not seeking paid work is
because they are looking after their family. Due to small sample sizes, this
category includes both those looking after dependent children, and other
family/household care reasons, such as caring for another adult;
• people who state their main reason for not looking for work is their sickness,
illness or disability;
• other categories of International Labour Organisation (ILO) economic
inactivity.2
The first three categories represented the most common reported reasons.
Although the questionnaire items we use provide a broad overview of the reasons
economically inactive lone parents state why they would presently not like a
job, they do not provide any detailed insight into the underlying causal factors
determining such responses. A person stating that the main reason they would
presently not like a job is that they are looking after their family might reflect
the (past or present) deliberation of constraints or personal difficulties faced
on attempting to combine paid work and parenthood, as opposed to a ‘free’
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or unconstrained choice to give preference to domestic activities. Alternatively,
as Burchardt and Le Grand (2002) note, although some people may have the
‘capability’ or opportunity to enter paid work, they may actively choose not to do
so at a given time and to allocate greater time resources to childrearing or other
personally valued non-market activities. We therefore do not draw conclusions
on the extent to which our outcome measures reflect ‘preferences’ (Hakim, 2000,
2004), ‘constraints’ (for example, see; Crompton, 1998; Fagan, 2001; McCrae,
2003a, 2003b) or the extent to which people have the capability3 (see Sen, 1997)
to enter paid work. For present purposes, we treat such factors as not directly
observed. Nonetheless, as we discuss, it is conceivable that the increased mandated
activation of lone parents who presently state they would not like a job is likely
to raise job retention issues, albeit in different manners, regardless of whether a
person has the capacity to take up paid work, or whether labour market barriers or
constraints presently make entering paid work an unviable or excessively difficult
option.
Characteristics
Our principal concern is to explore the above outcome measures in relation
to age of youngest dependent child, grouped to reflect current and proposed
policies on compulsory job search activity. In our multivariate analysis, using
logistic regression, we examine whether differences by youngest dependent child
age in our outcome measures persist after controlling for other characteristics.
The factors considered are levels of educational attainment, respondent’s age,
‘category’ of lone parenthood (that is, single/never married, divorced/separated
or widowed), whether respondents have ever had a job in the past and self-
reported incapacity. Government Office Region and ethnicity4 are also included
in the models, although not reported here.
Findings
Overall, around eight out of ten lone parents (women and men grouped
together) claiming IS for reasons of lone parenthood had not looked for work in
the last four weeks (83.9 per cent) (Table 1). Of these, nearly two-thirds (63.9 per
cent) stated that they would currently not like either a part-time or full-time
job. Notable differences were apparent by age of youngest dependent child, with
this number being highest for those with younger children: at around two-thirds
(67.3per cent) for lone parents whose youngest dependent child was aged between
zero and seven years. This fell to around a half (55.4 per cent) for those whose
youngest dependent child was between seven and 12 years of age, and to slightly
more (59 per cent) for lone parents whose youngest dependent child was older
(12+ years). Given that the majority of lone parents are women, the equivalent
figures for lone mothers were similar to those for all lone parents. These findings
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TABLE 1. Self-reported job search activity: ILO economically
inactive lone parents
IS claimants.
Reason: lone
mother
(women only)
IS claimants.
Reason: lone
parent (men
and women)
All ILO
econ.
inactive
lone
mothers
All ILO
econ.
inactive
lone
parents
%of population 38.0 36.9 37.4 36.7
of group
Looked for work
in last 4 weeks?
Yes 15.7 16.1 3.3 3.3
No 84.3 83.9 96.7 96.7
Unweighted base 2,109 2,215 2,245 2,388
If not looked,
would like a
job?
Overall
Yes 36.1 36.1 35.3 35.8
No 63.9 63.9 64.7 64.2
Unweighted base 1,754 1,832 2,153 2,290
By youngest
dependent child
0<7 yrs
Yes 32.6 32.7 33.0 33.0
No 67.4 67.3 67.0 67.0
Unweighted base 1,155 1,185 1,308 1,353
7<12 yrs
Yes 43.7 44.6 43.5 43.9
No 56.3 55.4 56.5 56.1
Unweighted base 310 182 385 1,353
12+ yrs
Yes 40.7 41.0 35.9 37.7
No 59.3 59.0 64.1 62.3
Unweighted base 289 187 480 548
Note: Column percentages, aged 18–60 yrs, excluding students (QLFS
October–December, 2006 and 2007, weighted).
suggest that the vast majority of people claiming IS on grounds of their lone-
parent status were currently not looking for paid work, and that around half to
two-thirds of this group, depending on age of youngest dependent child, stated
that they presently would not like a job.
Table 2 goes on to break down the main reported reasons lone parents give for
not seeking employment, presented for all economically inactive lone parents.5
Differences in levels of economic inactivity and the main reasons reported for
not looking for paid work were again notable by age of youngest dependent child.
Over half (56.4 per cent) of economically inactive lone mothers, whose youngest
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TABLE 2. Economic activity and main reasons for not seeking paid work by
youngest dependent child
0<7 yrs 7<12yrs 12+yrs All
LONEMOTHERS
Economic activity
Employed/self-employed/family worker 40.0 63.0 70.7 54.9
Unemployed (ILO) 7.2 6.9 5.2 6.5
Economically inactive 52.8 30.1 24.1 38.6
Unweighted base 2,649 1,271 2,116 6,036
Economically inactive: main reported reason
Not seeking. Reason: looking after family/home –
currently would like to work
27.0 26.5 13.9 24.2
Not seeking. Reason: looking after children –
currently would not like to work
56.4 35.2 20.4 45.6
Sickness or disability (adult) 6.7 22.3 45.0 17.1
Other reason 9.9 16.0 20.7 13.1
Unweighted base 1370 377 498 2245
COUPLEDMOTHERS
Economic activity
Employed/self-employed/family worker 63.5 78.3 81.6 72.1
Unemployed (ILO) 3.1 2.5 2.7 2.9
Economically inactive 33.4 19.2 15.7 25.0
Unweighted base 9,226 3,675 6,475 19,376
Economically inactive: main reported reason
Not seeking. Reason: looking after family/home –
currently would like to work
17.3 17.6 10.5 15.9
Not seeking. Reason: looking after children –
currently would not like to work
69.3 42.2 27.9 56.9
Sickness or disability (adult) 4.9 15.4 27.3 11.0
Other reason 8.5 24.8 34.3 16.2
Unweighted base 2,980 707 1,033 4,270
Note: Column percentages, aged 18–60 yrs, excluding students (QLFS October–December,
2006 and 2007, weighted).
dependent child was below seven years of age, stated that they were not seeking
paid work, they would not like paid work and the (main) reason for not seeking
employment was that they were looking after their children. The equivalent figure
for those whose youngest dependent child was between seven and 12 years of age
was lower, at around one-third (35.2 per cent). This compared to around 69.3 per
cent and 42.2 per cent of coupled mothers respectively. There is thus nothing
particularly unique about our findings for lone mothers. Economically inactive
coupled mothers with younger children were more likely than lone parents to
state that they currently would not like a job and their main reason for not seeking
paid work was that they were looking after their children.
Although, compared to those with younger dependent children, lone
mothers outside the labour market with older children were less likely to report
looking after their children as the main reason for not seeking paid work, a greater
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number reported personal sickness or disability as their main reason. This was
the case for 45 per cent of economically inactive lone mothers whose youngest
dependent child was 12 years old or above. At the same time, the employment
rates for those with older dependent children were higher than for those with
younger dependent children (Table 1). As barriers relating to childrearing reduce
with child age, more lone parents move into the labour market, although for
those who remain outside of paid work, other forms of labour market barriers
appear to come to the fore or concentrate. Notably, coupled mothers with similar
aged children were less likely to report sickness, illness or disability as their main
reason for not looking for work (Table 2). The comparatively poorer health of
lone parents is evidenced in other research (for example, Benzeval, 1998).
Not all lone mothers who stated they were not looking for work, because they
were looking after their family or home, did not currently want a job. Around a
quarter of economically inactive lone parents whose youngest dependent child
was below seven years old, and an equivalent figure for those whose youngest
dependent was between seven and 12 years of age, stated that although they
were not seeking paid work, and the main reason was because they were looking
after the family/home, they would currently like a job (27 per cent and 26.5
per cent respectively) (Table 2). Closer inspection, however, indicated that these
people were more likely to be those with children towards the top end of each of
dependent child age categories.
Other surveys include similar question items to those used in the current
study, but with different response categories. The Families and Children Study
(FACS), for example, offers the response ‘do not want to spend more time apart
from my children’ as a reason for not looking for paid work, alongside other
reasons, such as the availability or affordability of childcare. Using the 2005
FACS, Hoxhallari et al. (2007) found that 44 per cent of lone parents who were
not in paid work stated not wanting to spend more time apart from their children
as a reason for not undertaking paid work of 16 or more hours per week. The
corresponding percentages for people who reported childcare availability (15 per
cent) or affordability (7per cent) were considerably lower. These figures, however,
were not broken down by dependent child age.
Multivariate analysis
The multivariate analysis considers whether differences by dependent child
age persist after controlling for other factors. Comparisons again are drawn
to economically inactive coupled mothers. For this task, three separate logistic
regression models were estimated (Table 3). The outcome variable for the first
model (Model I) predicts members of the working-age lone-mother population
who are claiming IS on grounds of lone parenthood, have not looked for work
in the last four weeks and state they presently would not like a job (1 = yes).
The second model estimated (Model II) predicts members of the working-age
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TABLE 3. Logistic regression: reasons for ILO economic inactivity, lone and
coupled mothers
I II III
(Lone M) (Lone M) (Coupled)
Youngest child<5 yrs 1.98∗∗ 2.87∗∗ 4.10∗∗
Youngest child 11+yrs 0.66∗∗ 0.49∗∗ 0.50∗∗
Never married 1.19 1.09
Widower 0.70 1.58
GNVQ level 3 2.23∗∗ 1.91∗∗ 1.12
GNVQ level 2 3.93∗∗ 3.69∗∗ 1.53∗∗
GNVQ level 1 4.18∗∗ 3.15∗∗ 1.93∗∗
No qualifications 6.80∗∗ 6.31∗∗ 3.47∗∗
Health problem affects Kind/amount of work? (Yes) 1.66∗∗ 0.97 0.95
Age 0.92∗∗ 0.90∗∗ 1.10∗∗
Age squared 1.01∗ 1.01∗ 1.00∗∗
Never had a job? 2.57∗∗ 2.51∗∗ 5.61∗∗
Notes: ∗∗ p <0.01, ∗ p <0.05. Odds ratios. Aged 18–60 yrs, excluding students (QLFS October–
December 2006 and 2007, not weighted). Outcome variables: Model I: 1 = IS claimant on
grounds of lone parenthood, not looking for work, who presently would not like a job; Model
II: 1 = ‘ILO economically inactive lone mother, not looking for work, presently would not
like a job, (main) stated reason: looking after the family; Model III: 1 = ‘ILO economically
inactive coupled mother, not looking for work, presently would not like a job, (main) stated
reason: looking after the family. Base category: Youngest child 5–11 yrs; divorced lone parent
(variable excluded from coupled mother model); NVQ Level 4/5; No reported health problem
that affects kind/amount of work; North East; ‘White’ (2001 Census ethnic group definition).
Ethnic Group and Government Office Region control variables are not reported.
lone-mother population who are economically inactive (including IS claimants),
not looking for paid work, who say they presently would not like a job and who
state the main reason they are not looking for work is they are looking after
their children. In the third model (Model III), an equivalent model to model II
is estimated for coupled mothers.
All three models indicate that age of youngest dependent child remains
a significant predictor of both outcome measures after controlling for other
considered factors. At the same time, the findings demonstrate how low
qualification levels are particularly important predictors of these forms of
economic inactivity, especially for lone mothers. Compared to those with a
degree level or above certificate (NVQ Key Skills Level 4/5), lone mothers with
no qualifications were over six times more likely to be claiming IS, and state that
they were not looking for a job and would currently not like a job (Model I, Odds
ratio (OR) = 6.80, p< 0.01). Having no formal qualifications similarly predicted
economically inactive lone mothers who were not looking for a job, currently
not wanting paid work and who stated looking after their children as their main
reason (Model II, OR = 6.31, p<0.01). Although having no formal qualifications
similarly predicted economically inactive coupled mothers who reported they
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did not want a job and the main reason for this was looking after their children,
the difference between those with no qualifications and those with NVQ level 4/5
certificates was not as large (Model III, OR = 3.47, p< 0.01). Levels of educational
attainment therefore appear to be a bigger predictor of such forms of economic
inactivity for lone mothers than for coupled mothers.
Other findings indicated that lone mothers who had never had a job in
the past were around two and a half times more likely to be found in our two
considered economic inactivity categories. Those with ill-health that restricted
the amount or type of work they could undertake were also more likely to claim
IS on grounds of lone parenthood, and say they currently would not like a
job. After controlling for other factors, no significant differences were found,
however, between the different categories of lone motherhood (never married,
divorced/separated and widowed).
Discussion and conclusions
The choice agenda in welfare reform is primarily based around ‘opening up’
choice by removing obstacles to paid work and encouraging a plurality of welfare-
to-work providers and consumerist notions about empowering benefit claimants
by giving them greater influence within active labour market programmes. These
may be useful developments that open up opportunities for claimants. They offer,
however, a narrower conception of choice around labour market activity than
may be construed by many who are the primary carers of dependent children
generally. Lone parents’ freedom to choose whether and when participation in
paid work is appropriate is increasingly circumscribed as choice largely serves
to support government’s particular notion of what appropriate parenting and
citizen behaviour entails.
New Labour and now the Coalition Government, in placing anti-poverty
and economic wellbeing as overriding moral justifications for intervention to
promote work-related activity, have arguably overlooked an aspect of the mass
view of lone parents available in its own survey data. Despite prior interventions
and improved opportunity – whether through constraint or choice – many of
those targeted for mandatory activation policies state that they do not currently
want a job. Consequently, they appear, despite welfare reform, to still not view
paid work as an attractive enough proposition to enter the labour market in their
current circumstances, perceived opportunity sets or at their present life points.
A substantial proportion of lone parents whose youngest dependent children
were in the age categories forming the basis of policy targeting stated that they
currently did not want a job and that the main reason they were not looking
for paid work was they were looking after their children. Our findings however
do not say anything on the extent to which lone parents with younger children
may be receptive to measures as proposed for the work-related activity group in
relation to the Gregg Review proposals.
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The current findings also do not mean that lone parents who state they
currently do not want a paid job in the future will not be seeking or wanting
employment, or will be unreceptive to further policy measures. The extent
to which lone mothers state they would presently like a job is related to the
age of their youngest dependent child. In this sense, tapering obligations to
seek paid work by youngest dependent child age is to an extent consistent
with the manner in which childrearing influences decision-making for many
lone mothers, as well as with the barriers to employment faced in relation to
child-caring responsibilities. Nonetheless, although dependent child age is an
important consideration, economically inactive lone mothers remain more likely
to be those with other chronic problems, such as low educational attainment,
poor health or no prior employment history, and these employment barriers cut
across dependent child age categories (for example, see Hoxhallari et al., 2007).
Although childcare responsibilities appear less of a barrier to employment, lone
parents with older children, who are a target group for recent reforms, were more
likely to report sickness, illness or disability as a reason for not seeking paid work.
Life events associated with entry into lone parenthood, such as the experience
of domestic violence, divorce or separation, may also occur at any time point
in relation to dependent child age, disrupting employment (see Wilcox, 2000).
Other research indicates that children are more likely to be reported as disabled
in lone-parent households than married-couple households (over 40 per cent of
lone-parent households) and mothers who report their children are disabled are
less likely to be in full-time employment (McKay and Atkinson, 2007). For those
with children with additional care needs, care requirements may continue to affect
employment, even when children grow older. Discretion made in mandatory
activation policy for these sets of considerations is consequently warranted.
We make no attempt to identify the extent to which respondents’ statements
regarding currently not wanting paid work reflect unconstrained choices made by
people who have the opportunity and capacity to take up paid work but presently
decide not to, or constraints or labour market barriers that make entering paid
work currently infeasible, nor do we provide direct evidence on the job retention
effects of policy. However, based on other research on the barriers to work and
the employment stability of lone parents (for example, see Johnson, 2002; Bell
et al., 2005) some tentative inferences can be drawn on these issues. Where lone
parents’ reasons for currently not wanting a paid job mainly reflect significant
barriers faced towards entering and sustaining employment, increasing levels
of mandated activation are likely to bring a greater number of lone parents
into the labour market who are less ‘work ready’ than those who, in the past,
entered the New Deal gateway voluntarily. This may raise job retention issues.
Once in employment, factors that act as barriers to labour market entry, such
as inadequate childcare arrangements or poor child health, may act as ‘stressors’
on employment retention, triggering labour market exits (Johnson, 2002; McKay
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and Atkinson, 2007). Where this occurs, it is difficult to see how such outcomes
necessarily improve the lives of lone-parent families.
For lone parents, such as those who choose at a given time to remain outside
the labour market for childrearing but who have the capacity to enter paid
work, policy may present a double bind between duties as responsible parents, as
promoted by government, but interpreted and enacted individually, and state-
defined objectives of being a responsible ‘active’ citizen in the labour market.
Resistance to government-defined norms regarding when it is appropriate to
enter the labour market could lead to increased levels of employment instability
or cycling between paid work and out-of-work status if, having been pushed
into work, upon deciding to quit a job, lone parents are repeatedly mandated to
search for employment. It is also conceivable that lone-parent benefit recipients
may find themselves at greater risk of sanction as they move onto Jobseekers’
Allowance or ESA due to the more stringent job-search and work-related activity
requirements of these benefits in comparison to IS.
The public service reform rhetoric of increasing ‘choice’ or ‘empowering
service users’ sits uncomfortably with our findings and the context of welfare
services which in their very nature are often about enforcing certain behaviours
viewed as desirable by government. A genuine discussion of the nature of choice
and empowerment in welfare-to-work rests beyond the prescription of what is
assumed best for people and what it is assumed people want. Government social
security reforms and approaches to choice thus often appear more concerned with
addressing what is perceived as individual failure to find employment (Grover,
2007: 543), and developing a ‘sovereign consumer’ who acts in accordance with
market norms rather than enhancing the autonomy of social security recipients.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to the Office for National Statistics and the Economic and Social Data Service
for making available the data from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey.
Notes
1 ILO Labour Force Framework, 13th International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS)
in October 1982.
2 We emphasise using the term ‘ILO economic activity’ to indicate we are referring to a
statistical definition to avoid assumptions about care and wider family work not being
‘economic activity’.
3 We use the term here in reference to Sen’s Capabilities Approach, as applied to understanding
employment and unemployment (for example, Sen, 1997). This incorporates whether or not
a person has the freedom to choose a particular option or ‘functioning’, and so should not
be confused with the earlier discussed ‘Work Capability Assessment’ undertaken within UK
employment services. The latter use of the term ‘capability’ emphasises individual capacity
to enter paid work rather than issues of choice and opportunity.
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4 Past research indicates notable differences in lone mothers’ and female economic activity
rates more generally (for example, see Holtermann et al., 1999; Dale et al., 2008).
5 Given there is no such thing as eligibility to IS on the grounds of ‘coupled motherhood’, this
categorisation allows more meaningful comparisons to be drawn with economically inactive
coupled mothers.
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